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Abstract—Recent developments in the automatic transformation of protocols into Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)
interactions, and the selection of appropriate schemes for their
implementation have improved usabililty of SMC. Poor performance along with data leakage or errors caused by coding
mistakes and complexity had hindered SMC usability. Previous
practice involved integrating the SMC code into the application
being designed, and this tight integration meant the code was not
reusable without modiﬁcation. The progress that has been made
to date towards the selection of different schemes focuses solely on
the two-party paradigm in a static set-up, and does not consider
changing contexts. Contexts, for secure multiparty computation,
include the number of participants, link latency, trust and
security requirements such as broadcast, dishonest majority etc.
Variable Interpretation is a concept we propose whereby speciﬁc
domain constructs, such as multiparty computation descriptions,
are explicitly removed from the application code and expressed
in SMC domain representation. This mirrors current practice
in presenting a language or API to hide SMC complexity, but
extends it by allowing the interpretation of the SMC to be adapted
to the context. It also decouples SMC from human co-ordination
by introducing a rule-based dynamic negotiation of protocols.
Experiments were carried out to validate the method, running a
multiparty computation on a variable interpreter for SMC using
different protocols in different contexts.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Secure multiparty computation (SMC) is a growing domain
of both pure and applied research interest. It allows multiple
parties to learn the result of some computation on data held
by the parties, without any party revealing their data. The only
information which may be gained by a dishonest participant
is that which may be deduced from the function output and
input known to the participant. There are several different
general-purpose SMC schemes, both for binary and arithmetic
computations, and families of more specialised protocols for
calculating the result of a particular function on the inputs
of the parties. While specialised protocols are less ﬂexible,
they can be faster than general purpose SMC, depending on
context. Some specialised protocols also offer advantages in
terms of security thresholds. Different contexts impact various
protocols to differing degrees. Some protocols can scale easily
in the number of participants, while others cannot, but scale
well in the message space (the range of values acceptable as
input). Some are computationally bound, while others suffer
severely from network latency issues. Some provide higher
thresholds of tolerance for dishonest parties while others
provide greater security guarantees for a given threshold. There
is no one protocol which is most suitable in all contexts.
c
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It is frequently the case that the SMC logic is baked into
application code, and the choice of protocol is based on
what was suitable for the ﬁrst use of the application, limiting
reusability of programs. More recently, the SMC logic is
represented in an abstract language at design time, but with
either a predetermined implementation strategy [12], or an
implementation baked into the conﬁguration at deployment
time [37]. We argue that for some applications, a contextneutral representation of secure multiparty computations is
more appropriate, allowing the detailed interpretation of the
computation to be selected based on the relevant contexts.
Our contribution is a framework in development, in which
multiparty computations are requested on behalf of client
applications. Protocols are dynamically and autonomously
negotiated between the various parties using the framework,
and orchestrated using the most suitable protocol for the
context which provides the necessary security guarantees.
In section II we examine state of the art in SMC frameworks, section III sets out our goals and contribution, section
IV describes our feasibility analysis and experiments and
section V lists conclusions and future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND R ELATED W ORK
The ﬁrst realisation of Secure Multiparty Computation was
introduced by Yao with the millionaires’ problem [43], evaluating an inequality over a limited input space with computational security, using a one-out-of-n oblivious transfer. Since
then, many variations have emerged, and advances have been
realised, in efﬁciency, security and adversary model. Schemes
have been based on not just garbled circuits, but also secret
shares, including boolean [17], additive arithmetic [4], [14] or
Shamir [40]. Specialised adaptations include anonymity [42],
deniability [6] and covert operation [7].
A. Classiﬁcation of Secure Multiparty Computation Protocols
While many different forms of SMC exist, they can be
broadly categorised as being general purpose or specialised.
General purpose protocols represent arbitrary non-branching
computations as arithmetic circuits, typically using Beaver’s
efﬁcient multiplication [1]; boolean circuits using the GMW
[17] protocol, or binary circuits garbled using derivatives of
Yao’s [43] original technique. Many specialised protocols for
arithmetic or statistical operations trade generality for greater
efﬁciency, increased collusion tolerance or other advantages.
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B. Multiparty Computation in different contexts
Existing practice, until recently, in multiparty computation
involved one of: Trusted computation, Universal application
of SMC, or custom coding. Mixed-mode programming and
ﬂexible implementation are two recent trends making secure
multiparty computation more practical and usable. Delegating
computation functions to a trusted party is not SMC, but is
appropriate in some circumstances.
1) Universal SMC: Domain speciﬁc languages for some
time [21], [31], [34] sought to capture intentions of SMC
programmers at a higher level. Computations are described
in a language for secure multiparty computation, and all computation is performed collaboratively in a privacy-preserving
manner. This guarantees that all computations are privacypreserving, but may be inefﬁcient [20].
2) Custom coded approach: A program involving multiparty computations, one or more of which must be carried
out in a privacy-preserving manner, is coded such that those
computations requiring secrecy are carried out using some
SMC protocol which fulﬁlls the requirements. The protocols
may be hand-coded into the application, or generated with tool
assistance [20], reducing errors, but requiring expertise on the
part of the programmer, such as binary circuit description.
3) Mixed-mode programming: Wisteria [38] improves the
tradeoff between ease of programming and efﬁciency where
not all operations need to be carried out securely, allowing
very similar lines of code, labelled parallel (local, non-SMC)
and secure, for programs which carry out the same instructions
in a secure multiparty or local open fashion.
4) Flexible implementation: A description of the computation to be performed is provided in terms of an SMC API [37],
and is closest to our work. The SMC API includes operations
which can be performed by garbled circuits, boolean and
arithmetic secret sharing: addition, multiplication;
boolean sharing and garbled circuits: subtract, and,
xor, mux, equality, greater-equal. The ability
to select protocols on a per-node basis is facilitated by efﬁcient
conversions between arithmetic, boolean and Yao shares [12].
Previous work treating the two-party paradigm established
that, even for just decisions involving only two schemes, the
computational and network costs would be difﬁcult to optimise
by hand [23].
Computational, network, or ﬁnancial (e.g. computation +
network costs on Amazon) costs are used for two-party computation protocol selection [37]. Selection by number of participants, collusion threshold, message space size, repeatability,
auditability or security model, is not seen in the literature.
C. Comparison of frameworks for SMC
There are a range of frameworks to support secure multiparty computation available, with differing characteristics,
strengths, weaknesses, and appropriate circumstances of use.
Table I lists some important features of frameworks for
secure computation. Some can accommodate an unbounded
(except computationally) number of participants, while others
are restricted to two or three-party computation. Almost all of

the frameworks listed here use an associated language which
abstracts from the complexity of multiparty computation.
1) Types of Secure Computation: Several of the frameworks
offer computation on integers distributed as uniformly random
additive shares in Zp or Z2l ; these require secure channels
for privacy in the n > 2 models. Additive shares do not
tolerate misbehaving parties, and can be thought of as an
n-out-of-n sharing, although not an issue where n = 2.
Replication using pseudorandom secret sharing [9] allows
larger (approx. 3 < n < 15) groups tolerating a small
number of misbehaving parties. Shamir secret sharing [40] also
requires secure channels for privacy, and can tolerate t < n3
corrupted parties, the maximum for the information-theoretic
setting. Boolean shares are single bits, shared in a similar
manner so that any k > t parties can reconstruct each bit. Yao
garbled circuits and values are encrypted by one party, with
keys for the other party’s values obliviously transferred to that
party. Homomorphic encryption allows blind computations on
encrypted data supplied by another party. Schemes for future
inclusion in our framework are marked ’f ’ in table I.
2) Specialised Protocols: Specialised protocols for many
functions outperform generic formulations of the equivalent
function in general-purpose secure multiparty computation
schemes. Only ObliVM [28] offers explicit support for specialised protocols, though its authors caution against their
use as a waste of developer and cryptographer time. If however, concerns surrounding privacy and proﬁling of online
footprints [24], [33] and DNA [13] continue to grow, then
mitigation measures [11], [35] will increase in importance.
Many specialist protocols, such as privacy-preserving classiﬁers [5], perform far better than standard privacy-preserving
implementations of the basic algorithms. The development of
high performance specialised protocols for secure multiparty
computation of statistical functions is seen as a priority in a
European Commission sponsored SMC publication [41].
3) Mixed Protocols: Some frameworks allow interactions
to be built as trees of nodes in which different SMC protocols
are used. The ability to convert shares from one form to
another [9] facilitates a much wider selection of possible
solutions, where one part of a computation uses one form of
shares, which are converted to another form for subsequent
computation. Performance evaluations of the ABY [12] framework showed these often outperform single protocol solutions.
4) Automatic Selection: While ABY supports these mixes
of SMC schemes, it is the responsibility of the programmer
to specify which to use for what portions of the computation,
a task which grows considerably with circuit size, particularly
difﬁcult if the programmer is not a domain or SMC expert.
CheapSMC [37] uses heuristics to assign an efﬁcient combination of SMC schemes to the nodes of the computation.
5) Parties, Security model, Thresholds: Many frameworks
are restricted to two parties, and each must assume the other
is corrupt. For frameworks supporting three or more parties,
however, the number and type of corruption which may be
tolerated is important, as it may determine whether a computation may proceed, for a particular set of parties. Frameworks
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TABLE I: Feature Comparison of Secure Multiparty Computation Frameworks
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actively secure against malicious or byzantine adversaries are
marked ’a’ in table I; those which provide passive protection
against semi-honest adversaries are denoted ’p’. PCF [25] is
adversary-model agnostic, denoted ’v’. Some schemes require
authenticated secure channels between all parties, including
by deﬁnition those providing information-theoretic security.
There is no advantage, and frequently a performance penalty in
forcing a higher threshold or security level than is considered
adequate, motivating variable thresholds, as in VIFF [10].
6) Oblivious RAM: Almost all available SMC frameworks
operate on the basis of a circuit, with all inputs being
treated equally, meaning searching data requires time O(n)
in the size of the dataset. Oblivious RAM [16] avoids linear
overheads, but the large constant terms in asymptotically
sublinear solutions remained an obstacle until a two-server
model was proposed [29]. ObliVM [28] is the only secure
multiparty computation framework which explicitly supports
private computations using oblivious RAM.
7) Dynamic Negotiation: Prior to the development of the
frameworks discussed, the main effort involved in carrying
out a secure multiparty computation consisted of its manual
translation into code with no support built in. This has,
for the most part, changed, so that once an interaction has
been speciﬁed in a suitable language, it can be deployed
and executed without delay. Research continues to improve
the efﬁciency of the underlying protocols, but the issue of
deployment and agreement to perform the computation has yet
to be addressed. If secure multiparty computation is used to
mitigate the potential effects of an advanced persistent threat,
then ad-hoc solutions are viable. For multiple parties across
different administrative domains, this is not possible however,
and the bottleneck becomes the deployment, authorisation, and
coordination of protocol commencement. We are not aware
of any other currently available framework supporting the
dynamic request for and negotiation of parameters of a desired
multiparty computation, necessary for on-the-ﬂy execution of
desired multiparty computations.
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D. Execution Cost Projections
The principle of parametric estimation of computational
costs has been shown to be valid for two-party computation
[39], and the model could be extended to multiparty contexts,
with adjustment where environmental or privacy constraints
or resource limitations impact the running time. As protocol
running times should leak no information, performance data
could be reported to a community repository, such as github,
to serve as reference values for future inferences.
III. O UR C ONTRIBUTION
A. Goals
Fundamentally, our goal is to allow secure multiparty computations, which are described in abstract SMC languages to
• Run in a wider range of contexts (broadcast, dishonest
majority etc.);
• Support a greater number of participants than is permitted
by state of the art secure multiparty computation frameworks;
• change the protocol used in response to context change;
while ensuring protocols used satisfy all security requirements.
B. Illustrative Motivating Example
Consider the example of three parties computing simple
sums of values for an hourly commodity auction, communicating over a local network. The fact that three independent
trading companies have servers on a physical LAN is not
unusual, as data centre or rack co-location with stock exchange
servers allows leased server space command a signiﬁcant
premium [3]. The exceptionally small latency between the
companies’ machines means that communicational cost is of
limited concern to the parties, due to its limited impact on
the cost of the protocol. Three party computations could be
written in SecreC [21], a C-like language which is optimised
for three parties. This would allow a C programmer with
limited SMC expertise write and/or modify the program to
reﬂect adjustments to the rules of the auction.
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Consider the impact of a fourth company joining the computation. The new company may not trust the existing three not
to collude against it, and therefore schemes designed for three
parties are not a viable option. The interaction is rewritten in
another scheme. A ﬁfth company joins, this time from a geographically remote location, changing the latency and network
costs. The revised scheme is now not necessarily the optimal
solution, and the system is revised. As others join and leave the
interaction, one joins who speciﬁes that the corruption of all
but one party must be tolerated, forcing a further revision and
change of protocol, and so on. With a human already unlikely
to reliably select a near-optimal conﬁguration [23], the state
explosion introduced by the additional parameters described
makes this infeasible. Heuristic searches have been shown to
ﬁnd solutions which perform far better than a single SMC
scheme in many scenarios [37] [23].
C. Solution
We refer to our solution as Variable Interpretation of Secure
Multiparty Computation. A proof-of-concept variable interpreter for SMC is written in python using the twisted framework [26]. Protocols, requirement speciﬁcations and protocol
adaptation logic modules are pluggable, allowing arbitrary extension to new protocols or adaptation of non-core interpreter
behaviour. A participant in the network can issue an ad-hoc
request for an evaluation, receive replies from the candidate
parties indicating whether they will participate, under what
constraints; and proceed with an appropriate protocol.
D. Design and Interaction Model
Each node has an interpreter, which communicates with
interpreters on remote nodes. From the node’s perspective
the interpreter is seen as a black box, taking proposals for
execution and returning results or failure. The interpreter also
stores the variables on which it may compute in collaboration
with other parties, with restrictions on what computations may
be performed, and security requirements. Variables’ values
may be set, along with constraints on the use of those
variables, upon variable initialization.
A multiparty computation is described in a Javascript Object
Notation (JSON)-based format listing the participants in the
computation, their named variables, and an abstract syntax
tree-based description of the evaluation to be performed. This
format is detailed in section III-F. The computation is passed
to an interpreter as a proposed evaluation. That interpreter
takes on the role of controller for the evaluation, and sends
the proposed evaluation to all prospective participant nodes
for approval. The participants reply with their conditions of
participation, in terms of requirements for thresholds of colluding participants which may be tolerated, adversary model
etc., along with their relative preferences for minimisation of
CPU, memory and network costs.
The controller selects a protocol which satisﬁes the constraints which have been imposed by the participants, in a manner so as to minimise the weighted cost in terms of resources.
This selection, identiﬁed by a unique ID, is sent to participants,

along with the proposal, and the communication pattern for
the protocol. When all participants are ready, the controller
initiates the protocol. The participants communicate with each
other as prescribed in the initiated protocol instance, until the
computation outputs a value, returned by the controller.
Participation is always based on the agreement of the
parties, who check the characteristics of the selected protocol
against their requirements, to ensure it is acceptable. The
controller therefore has an incentive to honestly present the
most suitable protocol with an appropriate communication
pattern. It is important to note that the role of controller is not a
privileged or trusted role with respect to the computation. The
concept of a controller which is not in a privileged position
with respect to the participants is not new, in fact it is taken
a step further in the Secure Computation System [22] of the
U.S. National Institute of Statistical Sciences, in that the coordinator of the interaction may be unaware of the function
being computed by the participants. Although acting as the
controller of inter-party communications, the initiator of the
interaction is not necessarily the co-ordinator of the MPC.
This can be for one of two reasons:
• The selected protocol is a decentralised protocol, without
a co-ordinator in the security model. In this case there
is no need for central co-ordination, and the imposition
of one is unnecessary, and may even impact proofs of
security.
• The role of the protocol co-ordinator is computationally
intensive, for example involving a brute-force search
of the message space for a discrete logarithm. In this
case the initiator may delegate co-ordination to a more
computationally capable party.
One consequence of the consensual nature of interactions is
that the only effective attack admitted by our solution using
a conservative policy is time wasting, at reputational cost to
the attacker. It is clear that any attack against a protocol a
participant is prepared to use remains a valid threat where
that protocol is employed. This includes the publication, by
the co-ordinator, of a false value at the end of the protocol, if
the underlying protocol does not guard against this possibility.
The variable interpreter depends on the variety and quality of
protocols and the accuracy of their descriptions.
E. Protocol Description
An Instantiation of a Secure Multiparty Computation Protocol is represented in our framework by a tuple:
< P, N, T, M, S, C, R > many of whose values are ﬁxed by
the nature of the computation to be performed, or deterministically negotiated by the participants.
P is a Unique Identiﬁer (UID), used only to identify the
protocol
N is the number of distinct participants in a protocol execution, This is inherent in the request for an evaluation, unless the evaluation is FairPlay-style with a small
number of servers performing a computation for a larger
number of clients, who trust the servers not to collaborate
to reveal their data.
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T is the number of corrupt participants which must be tolerated without compromising the security of the protocol
instance, which is the maximum threshold demanded by
any participant.
M is the size of the message space. This is determined by the
maximum value which must be supported in the computation, for example in binary polling of 1000 participants
this would be 10 (bits) while other computations may
require 32 bit, 64 bit or custom length integers.
S is a security parameter for computationally secure protocols, in the same way as ECC and integer factorisation
based encryption protocols are compared to the number
of bits of an AES system of equivalent security.
C is the number of clients in a server-evaluated protocol.
This is relevant for systems like FairPlay where a large
group of clients trust a smaller group of servers not to
collaborate. Where this is not relevant, C = N
R is the number of times the protocol is requested to be
run. If protocols amortise a set-up cost across multiple
iterations, this is used to adjust the cost of these protocols.
It is assumed that R = 1 if not otherwise stated.
P can be thought of as the abstract protocol, or a class or
family of protocols, specialised by the other parameters.
P also has certain characteristic binary attributes:
• IT: Whether information-theoretic security is provided by
the protocol, in the presence of secure channels.
• Broadcast: Whether the protocol is compatible with insecure channels, i.e. it does not render the protocol insecure
if all messages are read by all parties, including the
adversary.
• Set-up: Is a special set-up required prior to initiation
of the protocol? Some protocols require some secrets
to be shared prior to commencement of the protocol,
typically yielding a simpliﬁed, efﬁcient protocol. The cost
of providing the setup is then amortised over several
instances of the protocol.
• Self-opening: Can any participant extract the result from
the communication record, or is a special collaborative
operation required to open the result?
• Owner-Evaluators: Are the data owners the evaluators of
the computation?
• Malicious: Can arbitrary behaviour by up to T participants be tolerated without compromising the privacy of
participants’ data?
• Multi-Run: Is the amortised cost of the protocol diminished when it is run multiple times with the same
participants?
There are also further characteristics which can be expressed
as a value or a function of protocol parameters, such as:
• Computational Cost: expressed as a function of number
of participants N , solution space bits M (Particularly
relevant for computations in the exponent, which are then
subject to calculation of a discrete log), and Threshold T .
• Communicational Cost: in messages per participant. Relevant in low-power wireless scenarios to minimise radio

•
•
•
•

transmission costs.
Rounds of Communication: For high-latency connections
this is a limiting factor.
Bandwidth: Communicational Cost in bytes.
Entropy: Of relevance where the entropy available to the
device is limited or known (e.g. embedded sensors).
Memory: cost per participant - again relevant in resourcelimited scenarios.

F. Co-ordination Protocol
Without loss of generality we use the term participants in
the sense of owner-evaluators. The parties who supply input
data execute the SMC protocol. The controller receives an
evaluation request and forwards the proposed evaluation to
the other participants. The proposal is structured as follows:
{<tag>, <uid>, <participants>, <operands>,
<function>}
Where <tag> identiﬁes the type of message; <uid>
is a unique identiﬁer assigned to the evaluation;
<participants>
is a list of participants details,
where the <participants> [index] may be used to
identify each participant thereafter; <operands> is a list of
inputs to the proposed function, identifying which participant
owns the data, and a label for the data; <function> is
an abstract syntax tree based description of the function
to be evaluated. It is outside the scope of this work to
determine how labels should be mapped to local variables by
the participant, except to note that in the entirely plausible
scenario where parties use the same software system, this
would be straightforward. Manual mappings to local variables
is even preferable to manual intervention to load data at
runtime.
The participants respond with:
<tag>, <uid>, <pid>, <response>,
<constraints>
Where <pid> identiﬁes the participant; <response>
is a boolean indicating willingness to proceed with the
computation, subject to all security criteria being met;
<constraints> are the constraints which must be
satisﬁed for the computation to take place, for example
{"t":4} would indicate that default parameters are
acceptable, so long as the threshold of collusion tolerance
exceeds four corrupted parties (t is used to denote the
threshold for collusion tolerance). Constraints may also
indicate the maximum number of CPU cycles required, or
some other resource-based metric, for resource-constrained
devices, along with (advisory) preferences for the relative
weighting of CPU, memory, communication bytes and
communication rounds in picking the protocol from the
shortlist satisfying all actual constraints.
The controller selects a suitable protocol. If a participant has
declined to participate, the controller may issue a revised
proposal, taking account of the departure, at the same time
as suggesting a protocol. Otherwise, the controller selects
a protocol by identifying the subset of applicable protocols
which satisfy constraints imposed by the participants, and
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selecting the protocol from that set which minimises a
weighted cost metric. It then sends a message as follows:
{<tag>, <uid>, <protocolID>, <setup> }
Where <protocolID> is a unique identiﬁer for the
protocol, hashed with any applicable version number to
ensure no incompatibility; <setup> is the proposed
communication pattern and any other setup information
required for any protocol which is not deterministic or
symmetric in its conﬁguration. <participants>,
<operands>, <function> may also be re-sent if
adjustment is necessary, and in such case participants may
alter their acceptance criteria for the computation.
The participants, upon receiving this message, if they are to
take part, i.e. if the protocol is acceptable, then set up the
protocol and prepare to handle protocol-speciﬁc messages,
before responding positively.
The controller then sets up the protocol, prepares to receive
the ﬁnal values, and initiates the protocol execution. If
applicable the controller distributes the ﬁnal value after the
computation has ﬁnished.
G. Restrictions
Certain types of SMC are by deﬁnition excluded from the
available protocols. Covert multiparty computations [7] must
be arranged in advance and hide participation unless the result
is favourable - seeking the computation leaks information in
this scenario, so it cannot be used with the variable interpreter.
Protocols incompatible with the operation of the variable
interpreter, were not considered further.
IV. E VALUATION
The goal of the experiments is neither to demonstrate nor
compare the performance of the protocols, which can be
reasonably inferred from theoretical calculations, but rather
to demonstrate the feasibility of dynamically negotiating the
protocol, and the utility of changing to a better protocol where
a change in context justiﬁes it. An appropriately selected protocol is more desirable than an arbitrarily chosen or statically
selected protocol across all contexts. In this initial work a
limited number of protocols are utilised, but the principle is
to demonstrate feasibility before expansion to a wider set of
protocols.
Executions of secure multiparty computations using the
framework were carried out on a DELL Latitude E5440 with
R
4GB RAM and a Dual Core Intel
CoreTM i3-4030U CPU
@ 1.90GHz running Ubuntu 16.4. Each replicate involved a
protocol being executed ten times, and the time for ten evaluations being recorded, and four replicates were run for each setup. Experiments were run in the context of a simulated wide
area network, with latencies simulated by introducing a delay
of 100ms on delivery of packets. This is, to a large extent,
responsible for the relatively long execution times, but this is
a realistic level of delay for executions across continents.
Protocol 1 was an Information-Theoretic (requiring pointto-point secure channels) secure, computationally light protocol requiring a number of rounds of communication linear

in the number of users, which offers no protection against
colluding adversaries [8], denoted Round Robin. Protocol
2 was a computationally secure, computationally expensive
protocol requiring two rounds of protocol communication per
computation, secure against n − 2 colluding adversaries [36]
denoted PCL. The framework was initially set up to force
selection of protocol 1 or protocol 2 for the experiments,
followed by executions where the protocol was selected based
on the parameters.
The results of speciﬁc protocol executions are graphed in
ﬁgure 1, with protocol 1 denoted by triangles, and protocol
2 denoted by squares in ﬁgures 1a and 1b. One element
of the context, the number of participants, had a signiﬁcant
impact on which protocol performed better. In the case where
output message space was ﬁxed at 16 bits (Figure 1a), with
up to ﬁve participants, protocol 1 was more efﬁcient than
protocol 2, but with six or more participants, protocol 2 was
more efﬁcient. Another element of the context, message space,
impacted performance of protocol 2 but not protocol 1. Where
input message space was ﬁxed, output message space is n
times larger, and protocol 1 remained more efﬁcient below 7
participants (Figure 1b). Where protocol 2 was executed with
input message space of 20 bits, its execution times increased
greatly, as shown by the circles, in contrast to the squares (16
bit input) in Figure 1d
Average running time for 10 evaluations of an integer sum
in the variable interpreter, with 100ms link latency (to simulate
Wide-Area-Network performance), n participants, were as
follows:
Protocol 1 execution times varied to a large degree with
changing number of participants, and had a minimum execution time for the ten evaluations of 10.1 for n = 3, and
maximum of 15.22 for n = 8, unaffected by bit length of the
message space. Protocol 2 had execution time which varied
mostly with the bit length of the result. For a ﬁxed maximum
result in 16 bits, it showed little variation in execution time
with changing n, with minimum execution time of 12.37s
and maximum of 12.58s. Protocol 2 execution times varied
considerably more with bitlength of the message space. When
input bitlength is ﬁxed, output bitlength grows with log2 (n).
For a maximum input bitlength of 16, i.e. maximum resulting
value of n × 216 , it had minimum execution time of 12.87s
for n = 3 and maximum of 15.4s for n = 8. For a
maximum input bitlength of 20, minimum execution time was
19.2s for n = 3 and maximum execution time was 30.6s
for n = 8. The execution involving protocol selection was
run with parameters derived from the results for individual
protocols and simpliﬁed: Communicational cost: Protocol 1:
latency ∗ (n + 1), Protocol 2: 4 ∗ latency;
Computational cost:
√
m
Protocol 1: 0, Protocol 2: 100 + 2 . With equal weighting
of communication and computation, this resulted in the most
efﬁcient protocol being executed except possibly for the point
at which the performance is approximately equal: n = 7, m =
n ∗ 216 . The performance under variable interpretation was
equal, within the variance exhibited, to the relevant single
protocol experiment for that number of participants. Minimum
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vi 10 times, where each value vi is held privately by participant pi in various contexts

execution time was 10.11s for n = 3 and maximum was
14.98s for n = 8 (Figure 1c).
It is not necessary to evaluate these protocols for different
collusion thresholds, as protocol 1 has no tolerance for interparty collusion. If collusion must be tolerated, protocol 2
must be used rather than protocol 1. On the other hand if
numbers of large bitlength were also required, √
the discrete
logarithm would become intractable, due to its m (where
message space m = 2bitlength ) theoretical complexity. In such
circumstances a different protocol would be required.

parties accept it, would save 4 rounds of communication.
This would be more appropriate in the high latency context,
while avoiding spurious set-up costs may justify the longer
negotiation in low-latency environments. The degree of variation in evaluation times suggests that a sufﬁciently volatile
context justiﬁes the overhead. The two protocols themselves
are chosen for illustrative purposes, being opposites in many
characteristics.

A. Relationship to Theoretical Values

The feasibility of variable interpretation of simple secure
multiparty computation programs, including dynamic negotiation of the protocols used has been demonstrated, with two
different protocols being automatically executed to carry out
the same command in different contexts. A marked difference
in relative performance is noted between the two protocols for
different parameters, with the relative advantage determined
in this case by the number of participants in the computation,
and solution space. Much work remains to be completed to
fully demonstrate the practical utility of the virtual interpreter
with respect to SMC, but its feasibility has been demonstrated
in principle. Existing work for the two-party context is well
developed in respect of minimisation of computational time,
bandwidth, or a monetary function of these, as a metric for
the selection of protocols or sharing schemes in a static
context. This work motivates and examines the inclusion of
thus far unconsidered options such as specialised protocols,
and unexplored parameters in the context of protocol selection,
such as number of participants, message space, and collusion
tolerance threshold; in the dynamic negotiated selection of
multiparty protocols for more than two parties.
The integration of further protocols including general purpose schemes is the focus of future work. Integration of
general purpose schemes will allow the direct comparison
of execution time including negotiation with predetermined
execution patterns. Other important future work includes the
development of policies and agents to move away from manual
authorisation and triggering of all multiparty computations.
This is where we envisage the real-world bottleneck will lie,
once the technology for protocol execution has plateaued,
much as the human decision to trade stock was the slowest

The experiments were carried out using the pessimistic 6
round negotiation, so for protocol 1, as expected, the time
taken is dominated by the 6 + (n + 1) times network latency,
reﬂecting the required rounds of communication. For protocol
2, there is a signiﬁcant computation in the ﬁnal discrete
logarithm, and while there is no n term in the number of
rounds of communication, the baseline is 5. The performance
of this protocol was in line with expectations, in that time
taken, over 11 times
√ latency, rose with message space m, at
approximately O( m). While the crossing point in ﬁgure 1a
indicates an advantage for protocol 2 for high numbers of
participants, the advantage would be reduced at lower link
latency. The time cost for protocol 1 also does not increase
with the size of the solution space, unlike protocol 2, where
the discrete logarithm dominates the execution time for that
protocol for large numbers - in ﬁgures 1b and 1d the solution
space grows with n. The effect of this can also clearly be seen
in a comparison between 16 bit (square) and 20 bit (round)
input values (ﬁgure 1d)
B. Limitations of the Results
The results were obtained by executing several independent
processes on a single machine, and non-optimal implementations of protocols were used. Protocols incur an overhead
from the execution of the protocol negotiation, which is
currently set to prefer extra rounds of negotiation to incurring
spurious setup costs. A variation of the co-ordination protocol,
employing optimistic negotiations, where the controller makes
assumptions about the likely requirements of the participants,
and participants which do not reject the proposal assume all

V. C ONCLUSIONS AND F UTURE W ORK
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part of a trade following computerisation, leading to the rise
in algorithmic automated trading.
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